Abstract. We study a problem of multi-resource fair allocation with bounded number of tasks, and propose the lexicographically max-min dominant share (LMMDS) fair allocation mechanism, which is a generalization of the popular dominant resource fairness (DRF) mechanism. We prove that LMMDS satisfies sharing incentives, group strategyproofness, envy-freeness, and Pareto efficiency, by exploiting the properties of the optimal solution. In addition, we design a non-trivial optimal algorithm to find a LMMDS fair allocation whose running time is linear in the number of users n, when the number of types of resources m is bounded. Finnally, we prove that the approximation ratio of LMMDS (or DRF) is infinity for the general case, and exactly n for a special case, improving the previous best lower bound m.
Introduction
Multi-resource fair (or efficient) allocation is a fundamental problem in any shared computer system including cloud computing systems. As pointed by Ghodsi et al. [6] , the traditional slot-based scheduler for state-of-the-art cloud computing frameworks (for example, Hapdoop) can lead to poor performance, unfairly punishing certain workloads.
Ghodsi et al. [6] are the first to suggest a compelling alternative known as the dominant resource fairness (DRF) mechanism, which is to maximize the minimum dominant share of users, where the dominant share is the maximum share of any resource allocated to that user. DRF is generally applicable to multi-resource environments where users have heterogeneous demands, and is now implemented in the Hadoop Next Generation Fair
In recent three years, DRF has attracted much attention and been generalized to many dimensions. Joe-Wong et al. [14] designed a unifying multi-resource allocation framework that captures the trade-offs between fairness and efficiency, which generalizes the DRF measure. Parkes et al. [9] extended DRF in several ways, including the presence of zero demands and the case of indivisible tasks. Bhattacharya et al. [1] adapted the definition of DRF to suport hierarchies. Zeldes and Feitelson [15] proposed an online algorithm based on bottlenecks and global priorities. Kash, Procaccia and Shah [8] deveoped a dynamic model of fair division and proposed some dynamic resource allocation mechanisms based on DRF. Wang et al. [13] generalized the DRF measure into the cloud computing systems with heterogeneous servers. Psomans and Schwartz [11] , Friedman, Ghodsi, and Psomas [5] studied the multi-resource allocation of discrete tasks on multiple machines.
Notably, Dolev et al. [4] suggested another notion of fairness, called Bottleneck-Based Fairness (BBF), which guarantees that each user either receives all he wishes for, or else gets at least his entitlement on some bottleneck resource. Gutman and Nisan [7] situated DRF and BBF in a common economics framework and provided a unifying polynomialtime algorithm to find a fair allocation. Very recently, Bonald and Roberts [3] argued that proportional fairness is preferable to DRF, especially assuming that the population of jobs in progress is a stochastic process. We refer to [10] to find other related works.
As mentioned by Wang, Liang and Li [13] , the users have a finite number of tasks in a real-world cloud computing system. They [13] studied the multi-resourece allocation problem in heterogeneous cloud computing systems with bounded number of tasks, and proposed a generalized version of the well-known water-filling algorithm. However, the running time of the water-filling is pseudo-polynomial. This motivates us to design a more efficient algorithm. In this paper, we consider the the multi-resourece allocation problem in a single server with bounded number of tasks, which is a special case of the model studied in [13] . We propose the lexicographically max-min dominant share (LMMDS) fair allocation mechanism, and design a non-trivial polynomial time optimal algorithm.
Problem Definition
In a cloud computing system, assume that we are given a server with m resources and n users. As in [6, 9] , assume that each user u j has a publicly known weight w ij for resource i, which represents the amount of resource i contributed by user u j to the resource pool.
Without loss of generality, assume that n j=1 w ij = 1, for i = 1,2,. . . , m. Each user u j requires r ij -fraction of resource type i. For convenience, assume r ij > 0 for all i, j. Let x j be the number of tasks processed on the server for user u j . The resource requirement constraints are
The weighted share of resource i for user u j is r ij x j /w ij , and the dominant share for user u j is defined as
The dominant resource fairness (DRF) mechanism [6] seeks to maximize the number of allocated tasks x j , under the constraint that the dominant shares of the users are equalized, i.e.,
The DRF allocation is equivalent to the solution for the following linear programming:
max (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) subject to (1)(2).
As mentioned in [13] , the number of tasks need to be processed on the server is bounded in the realistic multi-resource environment, i.e.,
Example 1. Consider a system with of 18CPUs, 36GB RAM, and two users, where user u 1 's task requires (1 CPU, 4GB), and user u 2 's task requires (3 CPU, 1GB). Assume that w ij = 1/2 for all i, j. The DRF mechanism [6] will allocate (6 CPU, 24GB) to user u 1 and (12 CPU, 4GB) to user u 2 , giving the allocation in Figure 1 Therefore, for the multi-resource fair allocation problem with bounded number of tasks, we want to allocate the resources as fair (may not equal) as possible, and the objective is to maximize system utilization (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ). The main problem we face is how to define "fair" . The well-known lexicographically max-min fairness [12] is a good choice. Given a feasible allocation, we compute the dominant share for each user. Let
. . , D n ) be the dominant-share vector, where D j is the dominant share of user u j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Noting that the system utilization (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) increases generally with increasing dominant-share vector (D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D n ), we propose the lexicographically max-min dominant share (LMMDS) mechanism for the multi-resource fair allocation problem with bounded number of tasks, which is to find the LMM-optimal dominant-share vector D, subject to (1)(3).
Fairness Properties
Let i j be the weighted dominant resource of user u j where i j ∈ arg max r ij /w ij . Similarly to [6, 9] , the following are important and desirable properties of a fairness allocation with bounded number of tasks:
1. Sharing incentive (SI). For all users u j : either x j = B j or there exists a resource i such that r ij x j ≥ w ij .
2. Group Strategy-proofness (GSP). No user can schedule more tasks by forming a coalition with others to misreports their requirements r ij or the number of tasks B j .
3. Envy-freeness (EF). For all users u j : either x j = B j or there exists a resource i such that
Pareto efficiency (PE). It should not be possible to increase the number of tasks
processed on the server without decreasing the allocation of at least another user.
Sharing incentive means that the number of tasks processed for each user u j is no less than the case where a r ij -fraction of each resource i is allocated to every user. Group strategy-proofness means no user can get a better allocation by lying about r ij or B j .
Envy-freeness requires that for every user u j such that x j < B j , she do not envy user u k when the allocation of u k is scaled by w ij /w ik . Pareto efficiency is to maximize system utilization subject to satisfying the other properties.
Consider the LMM-optimal dominant-share vector D = (D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D n ) and the corresponding utility vector (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), where
where
Here, ǫ 1 is a small positive number such that 
τ is feasible and lexicographically greater than D τ , which contradicts the fact that D is the LMM-optimal dominant-share vector.
For each user u k such that x k < B k , if there is a resource i satisfying r ik x k ≥ w ik , then u k is satisfied. Otherwise, D k < 1 and for an arbitrary saturated resource i ′ , we have Proof. Denote byD = (D 1 ,D 2 , . . . ,D n ) the LMM-optimal dominant-share vector when a coalition of users U 1 ⊆ {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n } misreports requirementr ik instead of r ik andB k instead of B k for all u k ∈ U 1 . For an arbitrary user u k , if x k = B k , user u k cannot increase its utility by altering the demand vector or B k . Thus, we assume that x k < B k for each
Denote by the (x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,x n ) the corresponding numbers of tasks processed in the modified system, whereD k = max ixkrik /w ik for each user u k ∈ U 1 andD j =x j r i j j /w i j k for u j / ∈ U 1 . For an arbitrary user u k ∈ U 1 , assume that the true utilityx true k of user u k is increased in the modified system. Thus,
which implies that
Consider an arbitrary saturated resource i in the original system (there must exist, as in the proof of Theorem 1). As n j=1 r ij x j = 1, j:u j ∈U 1r ijxj + j:u j ∈U \U 1 r ijxj ≤ 1, and x k r ik <x krik for each user u k ∈ U 1 , there is a user u h ∈ U \ U 1 such that r ih x h > r ihxh , which implies thatx 
where ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 are small positive numbers closely to 0 defined as in the proof of Lemma 1.
τ is feasible and lexicographically greater thanD τ , which contradicts the fact thatD is the LMM-optimal dominant-share vector in the modified system. Therefore, every user u k ∈ U 1 cannot increase her dominant share by altering the demand vector or B k .
Theorem 3. LMMDS satisfies the EF property.
Proof. For an arbitrary user u k , if x k = B k , u k does not envy any user. If x k < B k ,
by Lemma 1, we have D k ≥ D j for every user u j . If user u k envies another user u h , u h must have a strictly higher weighted share of every resource than that of user u k , i.e.,
Theorem 4. LMMDS satisfies the PO property.
Proof. Consider the user u k such that x k < B k . If we can allocate (x k +ǫ)(r 1k , r 2k , . . . , r mk )
to user u k without changing the allocation of the other users, it will contradict the fact that D is the LMM-optimal dominant-share vector.
LMMDS Scheduling Algorithm
Since the number of tasks for each user u j is bounded by B j , in any feasible allocation, the maximum dominant share for user u j is D Proof. Let (D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D n ) be a LMM-optimal dominant-share vector and
If there is a user u k satisfying
This contradictions the fact (D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D n ) is a LMM-optimal dominant-share vector.
According to Lemma 2, a simple way is to use the binary method to find the maximum . Delete user u j and decrease the corresponding resources consumed by u j from the instance.
by Lemma 2, we have
have the same dominant share D * in the LMM-optimal solution, and can be merged into a "dummy" user u dum . Let U dum be the set of users satisfying D j = D. Given a possible "dominant share" D dum of the dummy user u dum , for each user u j in U dum , it consumes r ij x j -fraction resource of type i, where x j = D dum · w i j j /r i j j . Thus, the dummy user u dum consumes D dum µ i -fraction resource of type i, where
Note that the number of users is reduced by half. 
, consider the following linear programming (LP):
It is easy to verify that D * is the optimal solution to the above LP and
For each user u j ∈ U dum , set D j = D * , and then we obtain the LMM-optimal solution
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code for LMMDS scheduling algorithm.
Algorithm 1 LMMDS pseudo-code
Step 1. Initialization. Step 2. Using the method in [2] to find the median
Else, set
Step 3. If U = φ, goto Step 2; else for each user u j ∈ U dum , set
Step 4. Output D j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
At each iteration k, since we have at most n/2 k−1 + 1 users, deciding whether D ≥ D * can be done within O(mn/2 k−1 ) time. Thus, the overall running time is O(m(n + n/2 + n/2 2 + . . . + 1)) = O(mn), which is linear in n when m is bounded number.
Approximation ratios
Given an allocation, we define its (utilitarian) social welfare as j x j . As defined in [9] , the approximation ratio of a mechanism is the worst-case ratio between the social welfare of the optimal solution and the social welfare of the mechanism's solution. Parkes, Procaccia,
and Shah [9] show that the approximation ratio of DRF is at least m. Noting that the LMMDS mechanism is exactly the DRF mechanism when B j = +∞ for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the approximation ratio of the LMMDS mechanism is at least m, too. Consider a setting with one resource and two users. Assume that w 11 = r 11 = ǫ, w 12 = r 12 = 1 − ǫ, and
The LMMDS (or DRF) mechanism produces a fair allocation with
It is easy to verify that the social welfare of the optimal solution is 1/ǫ obtained by allocating all resources to user u 1 . Thus, the approximation ratio is 1/2ǫ, which approaches infinity when ǫ → 0. Thus, Theorem 6. When B j = +∞ for every j, the approximation ratio of LMMDS (or DRF)
is infinity.
Assuming that each user contributes equal amount for every type of resource [6] , i.e., w ij = 1/n for every i, j, we obtain a tight approximation ratio.
Theorem 7. When w ij = 1/n and B j = +∞ for every i, j, the approximation ratio of LMMDS (or DRF) is exactly n.
Proof. Let (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and (x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * n ) be a LMMDS (or DRF) solution and a social welfare maximized solution, respectively. As (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) satisfies SI, for each user u j , there is a resource i such that u j receives at least w ij = 1/n -fraction of it. Then, for each j = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have x j ≤ nx * j , implying that n j=1 x j ≤ n n j=1 x * j . Consider a setting with one resource and n users. For j = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, the requirement of user u j is r 1j = 1/n, and the requirement of user u n is r 1n = 1/n k , where k is a positive integer. The optimal allocation will give all of resource to user u n , for a social welfare n k . In contrast, under LMMDS (or DRF) each user will receive a 1/n-fraction of the resource, for a social welfare n k−1 + n − 1. When k grows larger, the approximation Thus, for every δ > 0, LMMDS (or DRF) cannot have an approximation ratio better than n − δ for the social welfare, which implies that the approximation ratio of LMMDS (DRF) is exactly n.
Indeed, removing the conditions B j = +∞ for every j, we can also obtain the same result. Corollary 1. When w ij = 1/n for every i, j, the approximation ratio of any SI mechanism for the multi-resource fair allocation with bounded number of tasks is exactly n.
Conclusions
We have presented the LMMDS mechanism, which generalized the well-known DRF. We believe that LMMDS can be found more applications in realistic settings. One important direction is to generalize our algorithm to multiple heterogeneous servers [13] .
